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Had Wittgenstein left philosophy for good following the 1921 publication 
of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he would not have significantly influ-
enced the development of ethical or religious thought. The Tractatus fa-
mously holds that “Propositions can express nothing that is higher” (6.42), 
whether concerning values or God. Naturally, then, many philosophers 
working in its wake discarded ethical and religious statements as mere 
nonsense (and were bewildered, as Frank Ramsey quipped in a related 
context, by Wittgenstein’s regarding them as “important nonsense!”). Of 
course, Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in the late 1920s, and his later 
work did shape subsequent ethical and religious thinking—less through 
his occasional lectures or manuscripts explicitly treating those topics than 
through its general treatment of language, which abandons the austere 
Tractarian “picture theory” of the proposition in favor of emphasizing lan-
guage’s multifarious character, practical functions, and foundation in our 
social and animal nature.
These motifs have fueled influential, if diametrically opposed, accounts 
of ethical and religious discourse. Philosophers will naturally think of 
their metaethical import: Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations 
and purely descriptive metaphilosophy have been taken (e.g., by John Mc-
Dowell and Sabina Lovibond) to yield a naturalism-adjacent moral real-
ism (or, anyway, “anti-anti-realism”), while his refusal to regard similarity 
of surface grammar as indicative of similar function has been read (e.g., 
by Simon Blackburn) as congenial toward quasi-realism. Surprisingly, 
Wittgenstein’s bearing on metaethics receives no serious attention in this 
volume, which is quite imbalanced between its two titular topic areas: of 
the eleven essays here, just three give ethical issues center-stage, while the 
rest focus on religious topics (or, occasionally, give the two areas equal 
billing). But analogous questions to these arise in those contributions 




concerned with the proper Wittgensteinian account of religious language: 
realist, non-cognitivist, or some middle way to be developed. In what fol-
lows we summarize and evaluate most of the contributions to the volume, 
concluding with an evaluation of the volume as a whole. (We omit Chon 
Tejedor’s interpretation of “ethical religiousness” in Wittgenstein’s early 
writings and John Milbank’s critique of Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical 
philosophy of mathematics, for want of the competences required to eval-
uate them critically.)
First, we consider the essays dealing with religious language in general. 
Michael Scott’s well-written contribution could fruitfully have opened the 
volume: it clearly explains many substantive and interpretive issues that 
arise—often more opaquely—in other essays. Scott frames Wittgenstein as 
contesting the face value theory, on which religious utterances with the sur-
face grammar of assertions (a) really are assertions, (b) express belief in their 
contents, and (c) are true just if they correctly represent correlative facts. 
After surveying challenges by other thinkers to each of these claims, Scott 
notes points at which Wittgenstein himself clearly rejects the face value 
theory. Scott intimates that he finds it unclear just which alternative to the 
face value theory Wittgenstein endorsed: expressivism about religious lan-
guage could accommodate many of his claims, but so, too, would the views 
that religious language is used for distinctive practical purposes, or that it 
is apt only for a minimalist kind of truth. But some Wittgensteinian conten-
tions Scott cites—e.g., that a religious doctrine “simply isn’t a theory,” but is 
closer to “a sigh, or a cry” (159); or that religious belief isn’t “in the slightest 
influence[d]” by evidential considerations (157)—seem strongly to motivate 
an expressivist reading. Scott reasonably concludes that Wittgenstein does 
not adequately rebut the face value theory, since the existential significance 
of religious language could be accounted for by religious statements’ dis-
tinctiveness not in depth grammar, but merely in subject matter.
Mikel Burley’s essay contends that Wittgenstein’s interpretation of re-
ligious language is neither perniciously fideistic nor naturalistic in any 
atheistic sense. Regarding fideism, he argues that Wittgenstein does accept 
the benign non-interference principle, on which “religions are not amenable 
to philosophical criticism,” but rejects the pernicious incomprehensibility 
principle, on which “religions cannot be understood by anyone other than 
active practitioners” (53). The rationale for the non-interference principle 
is simply that, since “philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’, then a for-
tiori . . . it leaves religion as it is” (57). But if, as Burley suggests, the non-
interference principle entails that we must always understand religious 
rituals as mere practices, and never as involving a (potentially mistaken) 
understanding of things, then it totally insulates religious phenomena 
from theoretical reasoning—the very idea, it would seem, that rendered 
fideism objectionable in the first place. Burley considers this worry ex-
plicitly in turning to Wittgenstein’s naturalistic idea that religious rituals 
are continuous with instinctive behaviors. His reply seems to be that this 
carries reductionistic or atheistic implications only if these instinctive 
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behaviors and their objects are merely natural or devoid of transcendence, 
and that we should reject this premise. But this position faces a dilemma: 
if the states of mind these behaviors manifest are cognitively thin enough 
to fit Wittgenstein’s claim that rituals are grounded in instinct rather than 
theory, then it is unclear how the fact that our religious statements arise 
out of them could render them cognitive rather than merely expressive.
Next, we take up the essays dealing with specific theological claims. Of 
these, Genia Schönbaumsfeld’s is certainly the clearest, but this renders its 
shortcomings plain. For Schönbaumsfeld, theodicy necessarily—but inco-
herently—anthropomorphizes God. It presupposes divine omnipotence, 
which she deems incoherent (since lack of constraint vitiates agency), and 
anyway clearly false (since God cannot do many logically possible things: 
e.g., actions requiring embodiment). Further, it treats God as a member 
of our moral community, which overlooks God’s transformation of our 
“ordinary moral vision” (100) and, worse, leaves God with “dirty hands” 
in allowing atrocities, even to produce good thereby (102 f.). Her alterna-
tive is to reject any theoretical justification of evil as “itself evil” (105), to 
regard the problem of evil instead as existential and, in answer, to follow 
Wittgenstein in renouncing desire—and, further, Kierkegaard in “a joyful 
acceptance of existence” (107). Schönbaumsfeld’s negative arguments are 
too many and far too quick to be adequate. Indeed, they manifest more 
problematic anthropomorphizations than the theodicist’s view, as when 
she suggests that conceiving of God as a person requires treating God’s 
inabilities to “have sexual intercourse [or to] ride a bicycle” as limitations 
(98) and treating God’s goodness as conditional on whether God allows 
evils “with or without a second thought” (101). Moreover, her proposed 
practical stance toward evil has a better claim to moral repugnance than 
the theodicist’s: if it is objectionable to avert our gaze from the Holocaust 
to its eschatological redemption, how much more so, keeping our gaze 
resolutely fixed on the Holocaust, to joyfully accept the sphere of existence 
in which it figures! Pace Schönbaumsfeld, this is quite unlike Kierkegaard-
ian faith, which can rejoice in the presence of evil only through its confi-
dence (against the evidence) that God will miraculously restore what was 
destroyed. If it is impermissible even to hope for such restoration of our 
atrocity-marred world, the morally serious attitude is not joyful accep-
tance, but a full-throated condemnation of it.
Perhaps Rowan Williams’s wide-ranging and difficult essay is best un-
derstood as advancing two main arguments. First, he agrees with the early 
Wittgenstein that religious beliefs, like ethical statements, do not describe 
facts in the world. But he argues that Wittgenstein’s later reflections on 
aesthetics allow for an account of belief in God or Christ’s resurrection 
as forming a whole “system of reference” that affects all factual claims 
and demands response in the form of a transformed life. Initiation into 
aesthetic practices illuminates how religious believers enter such a system 
and learn to follow its moves from religious narrative to imperative. At 
times Williams seems to recognize that religious practices and attitudes 
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often depend for their justification on metaphysical or historical theses, 
but is frustratingly ambivalent and vague about this. Second, Williams ar-
gues that Chalcedonian Christology exhibits a concern for the “grammar” 
of God-talk comparable to Wittgenstein’s (and Kierkegaard’s). If Christ is 
fully human, then the divine indwelling in Christ does not “interrupt” 
his human action. This implies that finite and infinite activity are non-
competitive and that God is not a “rival fact” in the world. That, in turn, 
demands the above account of belief in God. What puzzles us here is that 
Chalcedon holds that the union of Christ’s divinity and humanity is not 
causal but hypostatic. It is unclear, then, how this union could have im-
mediate implications for the nature of divine causality generally.
The essays by Wayne Proudfoot and Stephen Mulhall concern Mulhall’s 
account of theological language in The Great Riddle (Oxford University 
Press, 2015). Mulhall’s account defies easy summarization, but is helpfully 
framed by Proudfoot as linking the Grammatical Thomists’ “recognition 
that language directed toward the transcendent Christian God necessarily 
outstrips the limits of sense” (114) with Wittgensteinian ideas concerning 
nonsense. Surprisingly, Mulhall appropriates Cora Diamond’s “resolute 
reading” of the Tractatus, on which evaluative and religious statements do 
not show higher insights or realities but are simply unintelligible. He em-
ploys two Wittgensteinian motifs to explain how theological language can 
possess “significance . . . [precisely] by virtue of [its] nonsensicality” (130). 
First, Wittgenstein holds that absolute value-judgments are nonsensical, 
but nevertheless continuous with our ordinary uses of evaluative concepts. 
They gain their significance, seemingly, through a determinate negation 
of sense: “we can see [expressions’] lack of sense in this [absolute] evalua-
tive context as a denial or deconstruction of the sense they make in other 
evaluative contexts” (131). Second, Wittgenstein compares mathematical 
conjectures without proofs to riddles. We only grasp the conditions a rid-
dle’s solution must meet to solve it when we recognize the solution itself. 
Mulhall follows Diamond in regarding Anselm’s description of God as 
“that than which nothing greater can be conceived” as such a riddle—and 
indeed, as a great riddle, one requiring “a determination of meaning which 
must come not from us but from whatever it turns out to apply to” (134).
Proudfoot argues that these two motifs pull in different directions. While 
Mulhall requires an account of theological expressions as discontinuous 
with established meaningful uses yet still significant for us, the first motif 
suggests an account of them as significant but continuous with established 
use, and the second suggests an account of them as discontinuous but 
lacking intrinsic significance. He thinks Mulhall right to emphasize (fol-
lowing Stanley Cavell) that throughout our ordinary language, we project 
terms into new contexts that preserve aspects of their prior significance 
while discarding others; what counts as a successful projection cannot in 
the nature of the case be decided in advance. Importantly, however, if (e.g.) 
“good” has its home use in the great riddle “God is good,” then it lies fi-
nally beyond any significance provided by our natural projective trajectory 
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for “good” rooted in its ordinary uses: “of [‘good’s] primary meaning, its 
application to God, we know only that it is always inadequate” (122). With 
Proudfoot, we fail to see how language-use that ultimately transcends our 
projective trajectories could carry any significance for us. (Disappointingly 
for the reader, Mulhall does not attempt to answer Proudfoot’s objection in 
his essay. Instead, after explicating his account, he considers its relation to 
Williams’s position in The Edge of Words [Bloomsbury, 2014]. The compari-
son is interesting but exceeds our scope here.)
Finally, we turn to the essays dealing with ethical matters. Gabriel 
Citron’s essay draws on Wittgenstein’s “Koder Diaries” to formulate an 
existential problem he calls the “problem of life.” The basic tolerability of 
our lives depends on numerous background conditions that are so funda-
mental we tend not to notice them unless we are unlucky enough to expe-
rience their absence. These conditions are fragile—it is easy for them not 
to obtain. If we notice their fragility, it is “not unreasonable” to respond 
with severe anxiety. Therefore, we are vulnerable to being miserable due 
either to the absence of these conditions or to anxiety about their fragil-
ity. There is a tension within Citron’s formulation of this problem. If we 
don’t tend to notice the fragility of conditions that make life tolerable, then 
the problem of life likely will not affect many people. Citron fleetingly 
mentions that Wittgenstein thought honest people should struggle with 
problems like this (33). But this struggle threatens to make us miserable, 
and misery, like severe depression, may hamper both our well-being and 
our ability successfully to fulfill our many responsibilities. This consider-
ation suggests that we are practically permitted, perhaps even required, 
to avoid dwelling on the fragility of life’s tolerability. Citron might reply 
with some plausibility that we would be better off if we could somehow 
directly face the problem of life and yet go on. But here he offers only very 
sketchy guidance about how this could be achieved.
Duncan Richter’s essay commends a Wittgenstein-inspired ethics 
of communication that prizes clarity as an intrinsic value. Clearly dis-
tinguishing concepts treats one’s audience as rational agents capable of 
assessing one’s claims; it also avoids a “reductionism” that obscures the 
world’s richness. Clarity is a form of “respect,” both for audiences and 
for the differences among concepts and among their referents. Richter 
raises concerns about “motivated linguistic innovators” who seek to ex-
pand the usage of a term to effect beneficial changes in people’s attitudes 
and actions rather than to provide an accurate analysis of the concept 
employed. He worries that such innovation blurs distinctions and works 
by manipulation rather than rational persuasion, but he fails to attend to 
relevant counter examples. Activists’ expansion of the term “rape” to in-
clude date rape may have blurred some distinctions, but it illuminated 
the salient moral similarities between various cases and improved the con-
cept of rape by clarifying that it is lack of consent rather than physical 
violence that makes rape qua rape horrendous. This innovation is both 
reality-responsive and rationally justifiable. Richter briefly acknowledges 
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that conceptual extension may reveal more than it obscures (225). Still, 
because he does not examine such cases in detail, his analysis of objection-
able linguistic expansions remains imprecise.
Sophie Grace Chappell’s essay defending the doctrine of double effect 
(DDE) is a highlight of the volume. She uses Wittgenstein-inspired argu-
ments to argue that intentions, like mental states generally, are essentially 
public. An agent’s intentions are linked to what action-types are ascrib-
able to her given her behavior, chosen means, and circumstances. This 
ascribability is, in turn, determined by convention in a way analogous to 
how the meanings of speech acts depend on convention. Thus we uncover 
the morally significant difference between familiar cases like Surgeon 
and Trolley: any interpreter competent with our conventions would as-
cribe a killing intention to the organ-harvesting surgeon, but not to the 
trolley-turner. Chappell’s arguments are too rich to do justice to here. For 
instance, she provocatively argues that internalism about intention would 
collapse the DDE into consequentalism and that while the DDE is helpful 
for addressing some moral conundrums, it is not the relevant casuistic 
device in many of the cases to which it has been applied. Her account fal-
ters in its Wittgensteinian reliance on convention, which is vulnerable to 
the consequentialist rebuttal that folk psychological conventions are often 
incoherent and require radical revision. When considering particular ex-
amples, moreover, Chappell appeals to reasons rather than directly to con-
ventions to explain why we take a certain result to be (un)intended. It is 
these reasons, we suggest, that ultimately decide between “conventional” 
understandings of actions/intentions and their consequentialist rivals.
Considered as a whole, the volume is uneven, as is typical of essay col-
lections. Further, its ideal audience also is not obvious. Philosophers may 
find some of the general treatments of Wittgenstein on religious language 
useful (including for students) and will find some of the ethical contribu-
tions thought-provoking, but likely will be unengaged by the theological 
essays. Theologians and religious ethicists are likeliest to be interested in 
all the topics treated, but may well find the theological contributions the 
most stylistically difficult—and rather disappointing in substance.
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Philosophy of religion has traditionally been dominated by work in meta-
physics and epistemology. The relationship between theistic belief and 
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